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Abstract - Currently, detecting potential threats in air
passenger baggage heavily depends on the human
examination of X-ray images of individual luggage items. In
order to improve the performance of airport security
personnel in searching images of air passenger luggage it is
important first to understand fully the requirements of the
demanding task. Here, an experiment is reported where eye
movements of naive observers and screeners were recorded
when they searched 30 X-ray images of air passenger
luggage for potential terrorist threat items such as guns,
knives and improvised explosive devices. Compared with
novices, the advantages of the screeners were speed and
accuracy in detecting threats. Eye position data revealed that
screeners were faster to fixate on target areas and once they
fixated on targets their hit rate was significantly higher. Most
of the IEDs were missed by both naive observers and
screeners due to interpretation errors which indicated the
importance of training. Stimulus salience at the first fixation
locations of naive observers and screeners was compared to
investigate expertise development. It was found that
experience did not change attention preference on stimuli
properties at the beginning of the observers visual search.
The implications and further studies are discussed.
Index Terms - passenger luggage, visual search,
expertise, salience.
1. INTRODUCTION
Air passenger luggage inspection within aviation security
has become an important topic of how to keep explosives
and other potential threats off aircraft. Although the American
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) contemplates
using computed tomography (CT) technology for screening
carry-on bags, the technology for luggage examination has
not changed much, as CT is more expensive than current X-
ray systems, and for other reasons. The detection and
recognition of potential threat items heavily depends on
human interpretation of X-ray luggage images. The most
useful information provided by traditional one-view X-ray
technology and expressed on a luggage image is an object's
density which loses the texture and the colour of the object,
and can make the object's edge and shape indistinct.
Unfortunately, from 'shoe-bombs' to the recent UK liquid
explosives plot, terrorist threats are both productive and
diverse. Screeners work under high levels of noisy and time-
pressurized environments and search for weak, infrequent
and changeable targets in two-dimensional X-ray images; so
it is arduous for security screeners to maintain a high level of
vigilance and knowledge about how to detect recurrent
'novel' threat targets among cluttered backgrounds. It is a
challenging task for human limitations of perceptual and
cognitive flexibility [1]. As a consequence, other than
designing appropriate threat detection systems, it is essential
to understand the requirements and extract task expertise so
as to improve screener's capabilities.
In domains of medical images examination, and other real-
world search, a two-stage visual search model has been
developed which provides knowledge to aid understanding
the task of airport security screeners [2-4]. In the first step,
called the global stage, a pre-attentive filter is proposed to
select a subset of features in a particular pattern for
observer's attention and specific purposes. 'Pop-out'
happens on the basis of simple local properties and for other
factors, e.g., size, brightness and contrast. Then in the
second stage of focal attention, every selected feature would
be scrutinized and interpreted by the cognitive system to
decide if it is a normal or abnormal area. This model
assumes that the two stages are serial processes where the
output of the first stage is the input of the second stage. We
move our eyes to acquire visual information and alternate
between very fast eye movement (saccade) and relatively
stable gaze (fixation). Information is obtained and the location
of the next fixation determined during the previous fixation
and a saccade then executes to that location. The
experimental evidence suggests that only part of the visual
information available to the visual system is processed in full
detail while the remainder is largely ignored [5]. What
locations or features are selected in a search task?
Alternatively, what determines the selected locations in the
visual field?
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curves of screeners and naive observers with sensitivity as
the ordinate and 1-specificity as the abscissa. The detection
performance of screeners was clearly better than chance
while the ROC curve of naive observers was equivalent to
chance. Analysis of independent-samples T-test showed that
the performance of screeners was significantly better than
the naive observers, t = 3.77, df = 14, p < 0.01. The overall
sensitivity was 0.458 and 0.250, respectively, for screeners
and naive observers; and specificity was 0.692 and 0.583,
respectively. The difference in sensitivity between naYve
observers and screeners was significant, t = 2.913, df = 14, p
< 0.05 while the difference in specificity was not significant.
The screeners' detection ability was therefore better than the
naive observers.
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Fig. 1. ROC curves of screener and naive observers.
To measure task performance, the mean reaction time for
accurate target-present and target-absent decisions was
calculated. The analysis showed that screeners made
decisions much more quickly than the na7ve observers, t =
2.475, df = 14, p < 0.05 for accurate target-present
responses and, t = 3.913, df = 14, p < 0.01 for accurate
target-absent responses. Fig. 2 shows that the nafve
observers took longer than screeners for all responses.
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Fig. 2. Rate of decision time between naive observers and
screeners.
B. Visual Search
Eye position data are recorded by the eye tracker as X, Y
coordinates corresponding to the horizontal and vertical
dimensions of the displayed image being viewed. Original
eye position data are fairly meaningless about how observers
are viewing an image unless these are grouped into fixations
based on certain spatial and temporal thresholds. Observers
process visual information when the eyes fixate on specific
areas for a long enough time. In this study, a fixation, or a
cluster of fixations, was determined by an algorithm using
2.50 visual angle as a spatial measure, which is a typical
useful field of view size found in medical image inspection
research and also in airport luggage image inspection [15],
and 200 milliseconds as a minimum fixation duration.
Each target area of a threat item was defined as an Area
Of Interest (AOI) for understanding how observers detect or
miss targets [16]. Then relative variables, such as; eye
position data of the time to first enter the AOI, and the dwell
time on the AOI, were calculated. In accord with the decision
time of screeners and naTve observers, table 1 shows that
the time to first enter the AOI, and also the dwell time on the
AOI of screeners, were shorter than that of the nafve
observers. Moreover, the difference between screeners and
naive observers of dwell time on the AOI for the miss
responses and the time to first enter the AOI of an IED was
significant, t = 3.867, df = 14, p < 0.01 and t = 2.625, df = 14,
p < 0.05, respectively. The hit rate on an lED for screeners
(12/72) was reliably better than naive observers (31/72) -
Pearson Chi-Square analysis, x2 = 11.97, df = 1, p = 0.001.
TABLE I
STATISTICAL VARIABLES ON AOI OF SCREENER AND
NAIVE OBSERVERS
Statistic
variables on AOI
Time to Hit
first Miss
enter Gun
AOI Knife
(msec) lED
Dwell Hit
time on Miss
AOI Gun
(msec) Knife
IED
Gun
Hit rate Knife
IED
Total
Screener Naive
observers
1181 2342
1337 2389
2191 2936
1619 4951
915 1817
3395 4559
1475 3664
1546 3473
370 1009
3286 4980
0.67 0.59
0.33 0.17
0.43 0.17
0.46 0.25
It was noticed that some targets were not fixated at all
while they were still recognized correctly. One of the possible
reasons for this is that the dwell time on these target areas
was less than the minimum fixation duration in the algorithm.
In such a short duration observers were still able to process
the visual information and reach a correct judgment. Another
possible reason is the effectiveness of peripheral vision
which increases the detection of some targets. The hit rate
for trials on which fixations fell on target areas following
correct responses and hit rate for trials on which no fixations
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TABLE 2
PERCENTAGE OF MISSED THREAT ITMES IN THREE MISS ERROR TYPES FOR NAIVE PEOPLE AND SCREENERS
Total Percentage of missed threat items in three miss error types (%)
Participants number Search error Recognition error Interpretation error
of miss Gun Knife IED Gun Knife IED Gun Knife IED
Naive people 91 0 15.4 1.1 3.3 3.3 6.6 7.7 3.3 59.3
Screeners 65 1.5 20 6.2 6.2 1.5 17 4.6 3 40
fell on target areas following correct responses were
calculated for the measurement of target recognition. This
analysis found that the hit rate following fixations on targets
for screeners was reliably higher than that of the naive
observers, t = 3.046, df = 14, p < 0.01; while there was no
difference of hit rate without fixations on targets between the
two groups, which both were very low with 17.4% and 11.8%,
respectively. Once threat item targets were fixated, screeners
were able to recognise them more with their expertise and
experience than the naive observers. If the threat item
targets were not fixated then both screeners and nafve
observers had a similar hit rate. The false alarm rate of naive
observers was 0.41, which was higher than that for the
screeners of 0.30. All of the information indicated that some
threat items were recognized by chance when naNve
observers made a decision.
Miss errors were classified into three types based on the
useful field of view and gaze duration [17]. In this study, AOI
was taken as a reference for the target area so that if
observers fixated on the AOI, then targets were scored as
hits by the eye fixations. Then if targets are not hit by any
fixations, such a miss error is called a search error due to
inadequate visual attention. If targets are hit by fixations and
the gaze duration is less than 1000 ms, then the miss error is
called a recognition error. Furthermore, if targets are fixated
for more than 1000 ms, then this is termed an interpretation
error. Most of the threat items were missed due to
interpretation errors for both the naive observers and the
screeners whilst the percentage of interpretation error of the
naive observers was higher than that of the screeners (see
table 2). Although participants fixated on target areas for a
longer period and processed the visual information, they still
missed the targets due to their lack of knowledge of what
constituted such a threat item. Missed IEDs accounted for
the main percentage of interpretation errors while most of the
knives were missed because of search errors which was one
of the possible reasons that the dwell time on knives was the
shortest, compared with guns and IEDs.
C. Initial Visual Selective Attention
Performance and eye movement data analysis showed
that the screeners' advantages were of speed and accuracy
when they searched for threat items in X-ray luggage images.
In addition, screeners were faster to fixate on target areas
than naive observers, especially for IEDs. Is there any
difference in the initial visual attention paid to X-ray luggage
images between screeners and naive observers? The
salience value of the first fixation point of the screeners and
naive observers was extracted from the corresponding
saliency map to examine whether there was a difference of
stimulus properties of these initial attentive locations. If
salience at the first fixation location of naive observers is
greater than that of screeners, then this may indicate that
naive observers are more likely attracted by salient regions at
the first fixation.
Itti and Koch's biologically pure model of bottom-up visual
selective attention predicts where the observer fixates in a
complex scene on the basis of salient areas which are
determined by complicated processing and algorithm. The
saliency model of Itti and Koch was used to generate a
saliency map [http://www.saliencytoolbox.net/download.html,
retrieved on 21, December, 2006]. Fig. 3 is an example of an
original X-ray luggage image
[http://www.delftoutlook.tudelft.nl/info/images/ACF1381.jpg,
retrieved on 13, July, 2007], and its generated saliency map
with regions of high salience shown in white. To obtain the
saliency map, low level vision features (colour, intensity and
orientation) are extracted from the input of the colour image
at nine spatial scales from 1: 2 (level 0) to 1:28 (level 8) by a
Gaussian pyramid scheme. After the linear filtering visual
features are processed by centre-surround differences to
maximize local differences and increase spatial contrast in
each feature channel to obtain a total of 42 feature maps.
Then multiple feature maps are normalized which eliminates
feature-dependent factors by two-dimensional difference-of-
Gaussians filter. The program ('saliencytoolbox') adopts the
method of "max-normalize" which maximizes the local
difference so that the real salience can not be found from the
saliency map. For computational convenience a change was
performed for normalization such that salience was scaled to
range from 0 to 255. After normalization, three conspicuity
maps for colour, intensity and orientation are obtained and
linearly summed into the unique saliency map.
For each of the 30 X-ray luggage images a visual saliency
map was calculated. Then the mean salience at the first
fixation location of each participant for all images was found.
The salience at the first fixation location of screeners and
naive observers was 137 and 140, respectively. The
difference was not significant, t (14) < 1.
Fig. 3. Example of an X-ray luggage image (left) and its
generated saliency map (right).
304
Authorized licensed use limited to: LOUGHBOROUGH UNIVERSITY. Downloaded on May 21,2010 at 16:14:58 UTC from IEEE Xplore.  Restrictions apply. 
IV. DISCUSSION
In this study, the difference between naive observers and
screeners on performance, visual scanning and recognition
skills was explored when they completed a simulated airport
security examination task. As expected, screeners detected
and recognized threat items such as guns, knives and IEDs
more quickly and accurately than naTve observers. Better
detection ability of screeners was shown by significantly
higher sensitivity and a slightly lower false alarm rate than
naTve observers. Also, the visual search of screeners was
more effective with a shorter time to fixate on target areas
than naive observers, especially for IEDs. It is impossible for
observers to learn about IED appearances in everyday life so
screeners benefitted from training and experience in
recognising IEDs. However, the hit rate on IEDs of the
screeners was not high in this study. Analysis of the reason
for errors showed that most of the IEDs were missed due to
interpretation errors where participants fixated on target
areas for a long time but they still missed them. This
indicated that as the form of IED is very changeable so that it
is necessary for screeners to update their knowledge of such
threat item appearances. Search errors were the main miss
error for knives in this study. One possible reason was that
these targets are relatively small within a cluttered luggage
background. Generally, screeners detect knives with the
assistance of the displayed image using colour to indicate a
metal present in the luggage item, e.g. inorganic materials
are marked by blue. If knives are made with any low-density
materials such as wood, glass or epoxy fibre, then it is
possible for an observer to ignore them - regular and
appropriate training is a solution for this problem.
It was interesting that participants detected some targets
even when they did not fixate on them. Although the hit rate
following no fixation on a target was very low for naive
observers and screeners, it suggested the effectiveness of
peripheral vision within visual search. Search and decision-
making, consecutive processes, were separated into three
stages in this study: search - decision confidence rating -
and indicating a potential threat location. Therefore, it was
possible that participants continued processing uncertain and
suspected visual information which was obtained via
peripheral vision during the previous visual fixation when they
indicated the locations of potential threats. This could be
examined by further subtle experimental investigations.
There was no difference of salience at the first fixation
locations between naive observers and the screeners, which
indicated that locations with similar salience were selected by
both naive and experienced observers in the initial global
stage of search for threat items in X-ray air passenger
luggage images. Salience, as a quantitative index, does not
distinguish between novice and expert at the beginning of
their search stage. However, which selective attention
mechanism, bottom-up or top-down, plays the dominant role
in luggage image examination and how visual salience
influences eye positions with the course of search is not
addressed from the results. To answer the questions, the
fixation number of human observers in a salient region is
compared with the number of fixations generated by a
random model in a planned future study. If the fixations of the
human observers in salient regions are more than the
random model, then the saliency map can predict human eye
movements. Otherwise, the stimulus-driven element does not
contribute significantly to selective attention in the task of
luggage image inspection. Also the difference between the
salience of human fixations and the salience expected by the
saliency map model is tracked with the course of visual
search for exploring stimulus dependence with exposure
time. If all this is achieved, then not only will a better training
scheme be provided but assistant systems with automatic
predictions of salient locations can then be embedded into an
advanced airport security scan systems as a perceptual
support.
V. CONCLUSIONS
The advantages of screeners are speed and accuracy in
the task of searching for threat items in air passengers' X-ray
luggage images. Their visual search was not only efficient but
also effective. However, screeners still missed IED targets,
although they had fixated on them which indicated that
screeners should regularly update knowledge of threat item
appearances frequently. There was no difference in salience
at the first fixation locations between nafve observers and
screeners. The saliency map model could not distinguish
between naTve and experienced observers at the global
search stage. In other words, experience of such X-ray
luggage images and the inspection task did not change the
visual attention preference of stimuli property at the early
stage of search for the experienced observers. More work is
clearly needed to understand the visual selective attention
mechanism for building a saliency assistant system in airport
security screening.
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